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TINKERING WITH THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE IN
TORT CASES: TORT REFORM OR PROLIFERATION
OF NEW TORT CLAIMS?
ADRIENNE MELTZER Fox*
On January 1, 1987, an amendment to the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure became effective which prohibits pleading a specific
amount of damages or ad damnum clause in all negligence actions and in
all actions claiming punitive damages.' This technical, procedural
change to the rules of pleading was not among the changes originally
contemplated by the commission charged with proposing solutions to the
perceived crisis in the North Carolina tort system.2 This commission,
the North Carolina Medical Malpractice and Medical Liability Study
Commission of 1986, proposed a wide variety of solutions to the
problems of escalating liability insurance costs and increasingly high jury
verdicts in negligence cases, particularly malpractice cases.3 However, in
the short session of the biennial North Carolina legislature, legislators
* Associate Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University; A.B., Goucher College;
J.D., Catholic University; L.L.M., Duke University. The author gratefully acknowledges the help of
Professor Anthony J. Bocchino of Temple University Law School for his thoughtful comments and
close reading of earlier drafts of this article.
1. Act of July 16, 1986, ch. 1027, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 617, 639-40.
2. The 1985 North Carolina General Assembly created a "North Carolina Malpractice and
Medical Liability Study Commission." Act effective July 18, 1985, ch. 792, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws
1336, 1357. See Maxwell, The Crisis Arrives in North Carolina, 16 TRIAL BRIEFS 10 (1985) (pub-
lished by the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, Box 767, Raleigh, N.C. 27602).
3. The formation of the Medical Malpractice Study Commission and the presentation of a
significant number of changes to the North Carolina tort system were attempts on the part of insur-
ance companies and professional associations to accomplish tort reform in North Carolina in the
1986 session of the General Assembly. Although the goals of this reform effort were far more gran-
diose and far-reaching, encompassing limitations on recoveries and contingent fees and a host of
other substantive measures, the tort reform "fizzled" and this particular measure, changing the man-
ner of pleading the ad damnum clause, was part of a last minute compromise offered by Rep. Joe
Hackney. Conversation with then Rep. Paul Pulley (Oct. 1, 1986).
Serious questions remain as to whether North Carolina ever had, or does have, a liability insur-
ance crisis warranting any tinkering with the tort system. A report by the General Accounting
Office, [hereinafter GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, reported that in the years 1983 to 1985
doctors in North Carolina paid lower premiums than in most other states. Durham Morning Her-
ald, Oct. 6, 1986, at B1, col. 4.
An explanation for the low malpractice insurance rates in North Carolina was offered by state
Insurance Commissioner Jim Long: "I think the basic reason you don't see higher rates is our juries
are very conservative in their awards. We don't have as many claims or suits being filed and the tort
system is more conservative." Durham Morning Herald, Oct. 6, 1986, at B1, col. 4.
Similarly, the GAO report concluded that liability insurance is still only a small part of the opera-
tion costs of doctors and hospitals. Another report indicates that North Carolina medical malprac-
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were unable to agree on any major substantive changes in the tort sys-
tem.4 Only one bill, encompassing several stop-gap measures, was
passed.5
One part of this omnibus bill, an amendment to Rule 8(a)(2), provides:
[a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief... shall contain] a demand
for... the relief to which he [the pleader] deems himself entitled. Relief
in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded. In all
negligence actions, and in all claims for punitive damages in any civil
action, wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), the pleading shall not state the demand for
monetary relief but shall state that the relief demanded is for damages
incurred or to be incurred in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
However, at any time after service of the claim for relief, any party may
request of the claimant a written statement of the monetary relief sought,
and the claimant shall, within 10 days after such service, provide such
statement, which shall not be filed with the clerk until the action has been
called for trial or entry of default entered. Such statement may be
amended in the manner and at times as provided by Rule 15.6
The 1986 amendments to Rule 8(a)(2) provide no specific sanction for
violation of this rule.7 In addition, there is no legislative history available
to help interpret the intent behind these amendments or to ascertain the
sanctions to be imposed for a violation of the amended rule.8
For these reasons, it is helpful to review the history of the North Caro-
lina Rules of Civil Procedure, focusing especially on the 1976 change to
tice insurance rates are the second lowest in the country. News and Observer, Oct. 8, 1986, at 18A,
col. 1.
4. See Conversation with Rep. Paul Pulley, supra note 3.
5. Act of July 16, 1986, ch. 1027, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 617.
6. N.C. Gen. Stat. § lA-i, R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (1983).
7. The uncertainty about what possible sanctions can befall the unwary lawyer who violates
Rule 8(a)(2)'s strictures is expressed in a publication by North Carolina's largest legal malpractice
carrier. An article in the newsletter of Lawyer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of North Carolina
refers to the change effective January 1, 1987 and states that this change would create havoc as
regards legal malpractice because "depending on the mood of the particular superior court judge, a
Rule 8(a)(2) violation could cost you a case on a Rule 41 motion." See infra text accompanying
notes 48-95. The newsletter continues:
The new Rule 8(a)(2) is pretty clear. However, suppose you are pleading multiple causes of
actions against multiple defendants. If you ask for excess of $10,000 in each claim for relief,
have you violated the rule? I don't have the answer. All I suggest is that you play it safe."
Coley, Malpractice Tips, LML TODAY Sept. 1986, at 4 (newsletter published by Lawyers Mut. Ins.
Co. of North Carolina).
Coley's concern regarding sanctions for violation of the rule as well as the actual scope of the rule
is justifiable. See infra notes 48-95 and accompanying text.
8. Representative Joe Hackney, the drafter of the amendment which became the new version
of Rule 8(a)(2), discussed the fact that there is no legislative history for this rule. He stated that his
reasons for introducing the 1986 amendment were the same as the reasons for the 1976 amendment
to pleading the ad damnum clause - to prevent damage to a defendant's reputation. The Represen-
tative went on to say that since the rule was silent as to sanctions, "case law would apply." Tele-
phone conversation with North Carolina Rep. Joseph Hackney (Oct. 1, 1986).
2
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Rule 8(a)(2) which first prohibited the pleading of a specific ad damnum
clause in "professional malpractice actions."9 Furthermore, in order to
understand the new amendments it is necessary to analyze those cases
which addressed the sanctions appropriate for violation of the prior rule.
This writer's position is that neither the sanctions now provided in Rule
1110 of the Rules of Civil Procedure nor the sanctions that have been
previously applied for violations of Rule 8(a)(2) adequately remedy the
damage to defendants that is intended to be prevented under the present
Rule 8(a)(2) ad damnum ban.
HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA RULES ON PLEADING DAMAGES
In 1967, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure."1 These rules were designed to sim-
plify the process of pleading a valid complaint in all civil actions. They
represented a policy of limiting procedural roadblocks to reaching the
merits of a lawsuit.1 2 The "notice" pleading requirement of these rules
applied to every civil case and significantly changed the former "fact
pleading" practice which had required that the pleader set forth facts
sufficient to state the essential elements of his legal cause of action.
13
North Carolina adopted a type of pleading similar to the federal
9. Act of May 12, 1976, ch. 977, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 6. The 1976 amendment to Rule
8(a)(2) first eliminated any mention of the ad damnum clause. See infra notes 30-39 and accompa-
nying text.
10. Rule 11(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure was amended as part of the same
omnibus act. Rule 1 l(a), as revised effective January 1, 1987, provides:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by
an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by these rules or by statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the
purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though
the pleading had not been served.
According to Rep. Hackney, the sanctions of Rule 11 are not intended to apply to violations of Rule
8(a)(2). Conversation, supra note 8. The North Carolina version of Rule 1 l(a) follows Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11(a). The federal rule was amended in 1983 in order to stress to attorneys the
need for a reasonable pre-filing inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty
imposed by the rule. Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986). According to the
advisory committee note to Federal Rule 11, the federal rule was amended in 1983 "to reduce the
reluctance of courts to impose sanctions... by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and
reenforcing those obligations by imposition of sanctions." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note (1983).
11. Act effective July 1, 1969, ch. 954, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1274.
12. Sizemore, General Scope and Philosophy of the New Rules, 5 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4
(1969); see also Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C.
App. 40, 187 S.E.2d 420 (1975).
13. N.C. Gen. Stat. § IA-1, R. Civ. P. 8 official comment (1983).
3
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practice. 14
The 1967 codification adopted a rule of pleading 5 that specifically re-
quired the pleader to include a "demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled."' 16  This ad damnum clause was
designed to give the defendant notice of those damages sought by the
plaintiff that were not specifically pled as special damages.17 At common
law, the ad damnum clause was a significant part of the plaintiff's com-
plaint because the plaintiff's recovery was limited by the clause.'" By
continuing the code practice of allowing recovery in excess of the prayer
for relief,' 9 the 1967 codification of the rules lessened the importance of
the ad damnum clause.2"
The practice of allowing recovery in excess of the prayer for relief is
consistent with the guiding principle of the rules of civil procedure to
enhance, not hamper, the decision of cases on their merits.2 In reality,
however, many plaintiffs plead a "claim for damages" in the ad damnum
clause that bears little or no relation to what they reasonably expect to
recover in the litigation.22 This practice blurs the notice function and
results in inflated damage claims within the pleading.
23
14. Id.; see also Redevelopment Comm'n v. Grimes, 277 N.C. 634, 178 S.E.2d 345 (1971);
Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
15. This rule of pleading stated that:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross
claim, or third-party claim shall contain (1) A short and plain statement of the claim sufficiently
particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences or series of
transactions or occurrences intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
and (2) A demand for judgement for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § IA-1, R. Civ. P. 8 (1969).
16. N.C. Gen. Stat. § lA-i, R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (1969).
17. North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g) requires that "[w]hen items of special damage
are claimed each shall be averred." 5 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1256, at 254, § 1259 at 261 (1969).
18. E. JAMES & G. HAZZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 149 (3d ed. 1985).
19. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 265-66 (2d ed. 1947) North
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) states in part, "every final judgement shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings."
20. The ad damnum clause is thought to have significance in those jurisdictions where the
pleadings are read to the jury. In such a jurisdiction there is great likelihood that an artificially
inflated prayer for relief could affect the size of the verdict which the jury might ultimately grant.
Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE
L. J. 1417, 1452. The fear is that the verdict will be based not on plaintiff's proof at trial, but on the
initial ad damnum. North Carolina, however, typically does not allow such a reading of the com-
plaint to the jury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § lA-I, R. Civ. P. 7(d) (1983).
21. A plaintiff who incorrectly pleads the ad damnum clause, but who otherwise states a suffi-
cient claim for relief, is not subject to dismissal. Fremont City Bd. of Educ. v. Wayne County Bd. of
Educ., 259 N.C. 280, 130 S.E.2d 408 (1963); North Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Lloyd A. Frye
Roofing Co., 32 N.C. App. 400, 232 S.E.2d 846 (1977), aff'd, 294 N.C. 73, 240 S.E.2d 345 (1978).
22. Many have commented that the ad damnum is really just an "asking price." See Comment,
supra note 20, at 1452.
23. The problem is further compounded because the pleadings which have been filed became
public records. Typically, industrious reporters check the clerk of court's office daily to determine if
4
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In adopting the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the legisla-
ture attempted to ensure that the mechanics of procedure did not inhibit
the decision of cases on their merits. 4 The rule on pleadings specifically
states that, "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial jus-
tice." 5 The sufficiency of a pleading is tested by a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 6 Thus, North
Carolina has consistently followed the federal practice of denying the
drastic step of dismissal unless such a motion shows affirmatively that the
plaintiff has no cause of action or legal claim against the defendant.27
This policy allows cases to proceed to a determination on the merits
rather than allowing mechanical dismissals for failing to comply with
technical pleading requirements.28 Adopted to implement this laudable
policy, these rules were intended to be uniform in their application to all
civil cases.29
In 1976, the North Carolina General Assembly appointed a legislative
study commission to examine possible ways of curtailing what was
viewed as an alarming rise in medical malpractice lawsuits, astronomical
recoveries, and most importantly, skyrocketing medical malpractice in-
surance rates.3 0 The study commission examined various methods of re-
lief for the "medical malpractice crisis.''31 These methods included
changing the statutes of limitation and repose, revising the standard of
care, adopting an arbitration system, placing a limitation on the amount
of recoverable damages, and limiting the contingent fees of plaintiffs'
attorneys.32
The recommendations of the commission resulted in the passage of
major legislation concerning procedural changes.33 Most importantly,
this legislation created a new article of the North Carolina General Stat-
any large suits, especially those involving well-known litigants, have been filed. Thus, the claim for
large damages becomes "news" which is disseminated by the media. Conversation with William
Smith, reporter with the Durham Morning Herald (Aug. 1986) [hereinafter Smith].
24. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 40, 187 S.E.2d 420 (1972).
25. N.C. Gen. Stat. § lA-l, R. Civ. P. 8(f) (1983); see also Sizemore, supra note 12, at 5-7.
26. N.C. Gen. Stat. § lA-l, R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (1983); see also Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94,
176 S.E.2d 161 (1970).
27. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1944); Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970); North Carolina Dep't of Human Re-
sources, 58 N.C. App. 748, 294 S.E.2d 377 (1982).
28. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 40, 187
S.E.2d 420 (1972).
29. N.C. Gen. Stat. § lA-I, R. Civ. P. 1 (1983). The rules remained constant with regard to
pleading until 1976.
30. Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 623, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 749.
31. REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE STUDY COM-
MISSION, at 4-5 (March 12, 1976).
32. Id. at 26-38.
33. Act of May 12, 1976, ch. 977, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 6. The act was entitled "An Act to
Revise and Provide for Procedural and Substantive Laws Governing Claims for Professional Mal-
practice: To revise the Statute of Limitations for Adults and Minors; to Provide for a Standard of
5
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utes entitled "Medical Malpractice Actions," 4 and it also addressed the
standard of health care, the necessary informed consent to health care
treatment, and liability limitation for first aid or emergency treatment.
35
This act also amended Rule 8(a)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure to eliminate from a complaint the "demand for monetary re-
lief" in all professional malpractice actions.36 This amendment applied
only to professional malpractice cases, changing the former practice of
pleading a "demand for judgment to which he deems himself entitled."
Such modification of the general rule was stated:
Provided, however, in all professional malpractice actions, including
actions against health care providers, wherein the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), the pleading
shall not state the demand for relief, but shall state that the relief de-
manded is for damages incurred or to be incurred in excess of ten thou-
sand dollars ($10,000). .. 37
Expressing concern for the stigmatizing effect of media publication of
the filing of huge malpractice suits, the legislative study commission rec-
ommended that an attempt be made to limit such damage to the reputa-
tion of health care providers named as defendants in medical malpractice
lawsuits.38 Therefore, the apparent legislative policy behind the initial
amendment to Rule 8(a)(2) was to help alleviate the harm to the reputa-
tion of the professional malpractice defendant.
With this as the underlying policy, the legislature's action is curious.
The commission's charge was to address a perceived crisis in the area of
medical malpractice believed to be caused by escalating jury verdicts and
Care, a Doctrine of Informed Consent, an Extension of the Good Samaritan Law, and the Elimina-
tion of the Ad Damnum Clause."
34. This section was codified at North Carolina General Statute Sections 90-21.11 to.14 (1975).
35. Id.
36. N.C. Gen. Stat. § IA-l, R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (1977).
37. Id.
38. Report, supra note 31. This concern for the stigma to professionals' reputations is appro-
priate, because a professional has, as his product, only his good name. The situation is markedly
different with a business which despite its own poor reputation, still has a product which may be
demanded by the public.
In considering the elimination of the ad damnum clause, the legislative study commission noted
that in jurisdictions where the pleadings are typically read to the jury, large demands for monetary
damages often resulted in juries awarding higher amounts. Report, supra, note 31, at 32.
North Carolina, however, does not typically allow the reading of the pleadings to the jury, so the
study commission was aware that elimination of the ad damnum in this state could not be expected
to lower jury verdicts. Report, supra, note 31, at 33.
It is also curious to note that some research suggests that doctors may be immune from negative
effects on their reputation of a malpractice suit because high occupational status tends to insulate the
doctor from imputation of incompetence. Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10
SOC. PROBS. 133, at 141 (1962).
A more recent recount of a physician's own experience of being named a defendant in a malprac-
tice suit that resulted in an award of $813,000 to the plaintiff includes the physician's candid admis-
sion that in the weeks following newspaper reports of the verdict, "patients didn't stop coming."
Eisenburg, A Doctor on Trial, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1986, § 26 (Magazine), at 42.
6
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malpractice insurance rates.39 The commission's goal of assuring the
availability of health care by controlling rising insurance rates and high
jury verdicts was an important one. However, the efficacy of the legisla-
ture's amending the ad damnum rule as a means of reaching this goal is
questionable. The commission's own acknowledgement that the purpose
of the amendment was to protect the reputation of health care providers
is the primary example of the inappropriateness of this legislative action.
One other change preceded the current version of Rule 8(a)(2). In
1979 the specialized ban on pleading the ad damnum clause was ex-
tended to "actions against product manufacturers, wholesalers or retail-
ers for recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to
property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in
relation to a product."4 This extension of the ad damnum ban to prod-
ucts liability cases arose from a comprehensive amendment to North
Carolina's products liability law.4 Neither the 1979 nor the 1986
amendment provide any legislative history. Thus, it may be assumed
that the policy of preventing pre-judgment harm to defendants' reputa-
tions is behind all proscriptions of the ad damnum clause.4'
While Rule 8(a)(2) has been amended three times in less than twenty
years to prohibit mentioning a prayer for relief in various types of cases,
no sanction is included in any version of Rule 8(a)(2). What then are the
consequences of violating Rule 8(a)(2)? Substantial problems are con-
fronted in reaching an answer to this question.43
39. Report, supra, note 31, at 3.
40. Act effective Oct. 1, 1979, ch. 654, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687, 689.
41. N.C. Gen. Stat. § lA-i, R. CIv. P. § 99B (1979).
42. Hackney, supra note 8.
43. In addition to problems of the appropriateness of a sanction for violations of Rule 8(a)(2),
the rule has spawned several other problem areas. One near and dear to the heart of any civil
procedure professor is the Erie implication of Rule 8(a)(2). Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). While there is a federal rule of civil procedure which addresses pleading in federal courts,
specifically Federal Rule 8(a), two federal district courts sitting in North Carolina have reached
contrary results as to whether North Carolina Rule 8(a)(2) applies to cases brought in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1948). See generally, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) (holding that the federal rules of civil procedure apply in diversity cases). Holding that the
North Carolina rule is merely procedural and not intimately bound up with a state right or obliga-
tion and, therefore, not mandatory in federal courts is Dean v. Litton Industrial Prods., Inc., No. 85-
82-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 1985). In a case decided just prior to Dean, Richards & Assocs., Inc.
v. Boney, 604 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1985), another judge in the same federal district held that
North Carolina Rule 8(a)(2) would apply to a pleading in federal court and added, in dicta, that
"failure to follow Rule 8(a)(2) would be a separate basis upon which this court could dismiss the
complaint." Id. at 1218. The conflict within the Eastern District of North Carolina has not been
resolved by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
An additional problem area arises when a plaintiff files a multi-claim complaint against a defend-
ant with negligence claims subject to the strictures of Rule 8(a)(2), and other claims such as breach
of fiduciary duty free from the Rule 8(a)(2) prohibitions. In such a case, there is nothing to prevent
the news media from producing stories that "Defendant Doe has been sued for $xx Million." How is
the purpose behind Rule 8(a)(2) effectuated in this situation?
One final problem area apparent to this writer-and there may be others-is created by the con-
7
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Generally, when a plaintiff's lawyer violates Rule 8(a)(2), he and his
client are subject to the consequences provided by the rules of civil proce-
dure.' These remedies are designed to punish violations and make
whole those damaged in their role as participants in the civil litigation
process. The remedies available are internal to the civil litigation process
and do not provide for redress of consequential harms such as damage to
reputation. For purposes of violation of the rules of civil procedure, the
only denomination of a person that is important is the "party to a law-
suit." When a plaintiff violates a pleading rule, the rules of civil proce-
dure can only make the defendant whole in his role as the defendant.
Who the party is and what he does for a living makes no difference.
Therefore, no adequate or appropriate remedies are available to redress a
harm to the reputation of a party in his role as the defendant.
The interplay of the special ad damnum clause for tort defendants and
the remedy for violation of its strictures is the focus of this article. The
future of this issue will be guided by an understanding and a synthesis of
the holdings in the three cases, Jones v. Boyce,4" Schell v. Coleman" and
Harris v. Maready,47 that have dealt with this difficult problem and form
the case law upon which the trial courts must base their Rule 8(a)(2)
rulings. These cases, curiously, involve lawyers as defendants in profes-
sional malpractice cases. Their analysis, however, extends to any tort
defendant whose reputation is protected by the current stricture on the
pleading of a prayer for relief.
Jones v. Boyce
4 8
Jones v. Boyce was the first reported case to raise the issue of an appro-
priate remedy for violating the ban on ad damnum clauses in profes-
flict in Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 9(g) which requires: "When items of special damages are claimed,
each shall be averred." This rule has been interpreted to require particularity of pleading special
damages under Rule 9(g), going so far in some cases as requiring allegation of specific sums sought.
Rodd v. W.H. King Drug Co., 30 N.C. App. 564, 228 S.E.2d 35 (1976); Windfield Corp., v. McCal-
lum Inspection Co., 18 N.C. App. 168, 196 S.E.2d 607 (1973). Is it adequate compliance with North
Carolina Rule 9(g) for the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to plead for "special damages for
loss of earnings in an amount in excess of $10,000?" This attempt at complying with Rule 8(a)(2)
may violate Rule 9(g).
44. These consequences include the granting of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), sanctions
under Rule 11, and involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b).
If the purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) were to prevent dissemination of the plaintiff's demand for judg-
ment, and thus to ensure the defendant's right to an impartial unbiased jury, other devices are avail-
able to resolve the problem. Voir dire questioning of potential jurors, change of venue motions, or
continuances until the dissemination of the demand for relief is forgotten, are alternatives that would
help provide the defendant an impartial and unbiased jury. But, it seems that such was not the
intent behind North Carolina's Rule 8(a)(2). See Hackney, supra note 8.
45. 60 N.C. App. 585, 299 S.E.2d 298 (1983).
46. 65 N.C. 91, 308 S.E.2d 662 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 763, 321 S.E.2d 145 (1984).
47. 64 N.C. App. 1, 306 S.E.2d 799 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912 (1984).
48. 60 N.C. App. 585, 299 S.E.2d 298 (1983).
8
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sional malpractice cases. Jones involved a legal malpractice action
brought pro se by a Central Prison inmate against his former attorney.49
The ad damnum clause of the plaintiff's complaint specifically demanded
one million dollars for compensatory damages and two million dollars
for punitive damages.50 Two days after the filing of the suit, newspapers
reported the filing of the suit and the specific amount of damages
demanded."
In Jones, the defendant responded to the complaint of the unrepre-
sented plaintiff by filing a motion, pursuant to Rule 41(b), for dismissal
of the action.5" The ground for the motion was the plaintiff's failure to
comply with Rule 8(a)(2). 3 The plaintiff then moved to amend his com-
plaint in order to delete the portions of the ad damnum clause that vio-
lated Rule 8(a)(2).14 The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to amend
and dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action, with prejudice, pursuant to
Rule 41(b)."
The North Carolina Court of Appeals was asked to find that the trial
court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's action for failure to
comply with Rule 8(a)(2).56 The court of appeals found no such abuse.5 7
In reaching the decision in Jones, the court of appeals considered
whether the plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend. 8 While
noting that leave to amend was necessary because a responsive pleading
had been filed, and furthermore, that such leave shall be "freely given
when justice so requires," the court of appeals determined that the legis-
lative intent behind Rule 8(a)(2) outweighed the countervailing interest
of allowing liberal amendment to a pro se plaintiff who had violated a
technical rule of pleading. 9 As evidence of a readily discernible legisla-
tive intent, the court cited the Report of the North Carolina Professional
Liability Study Commission.6"
The court next sought to determine whether the power of dismissal
49. Id. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
50. Id.
51. Raleigh News & Observer, Aug. 15, 1981, at 23, col. 1; Raleigh Times, Aug. 15, 1981, at
B5, col. 6.
52. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 360. Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure states, in part, that "If]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim therein
against him."




57. Id. It is curious that the court here chose not to imply the remedy of allowing the striking
of the offending portions of the complaint or any other possible alternative. The court's opinion
seems constricted by the defendant's response to the complaint.
58. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
59. Id. at 587, 299 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. 15(a) (1983)).
60. Id. (quoting the Report, supra note 31).
9
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under Rule 41(b) is a permissible sanction for violation of Rule 8(a)(2).61
The court noted that the power in Rule 41(b) must be implied as an
appropriate remedy where Rule 8(a)(2) omits any penalty for its viola-
tion.62 "Absent application of the Rule 41(b) provision for dismissal for
violation of the rules, litigants could ignore the proscription with impu-
nity, thereby nullifying the express legislative purpose for its enact-
ment.",63 The court of appeals did not discuss whether the violation of
Rule 8(a)(2) by the plaintiff was a case of ignoring the proscription of the
rule, or merely a case of ignorance on the part of the pro se plaintiff.
Schell v. Coleman'
In Schell v. Coleman, suit was filed against James C. Coleman for at-
torney malpractice and mismanagement of a receivership. 65 The com-
plaint included a demand for a judgment of $1,950,000.66 The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint for its violation of Rule 8(a)(2).6 ' The
trial judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on these grounds
and, ex mero motu, ordered that the prayer for relief be amended to al-
lege damages "in excess of $10,000. ' ' 68 According to the opinion, the
plaintiff never ified the corrected page of the complaint and thus the of-
fensive prayer for relief was never eliminated.69 Subsequently, the de-
fendant was granted a summary judgment."° Thereafter, the plaintiff
appealed that action and the defendant cross-appealed the failure to dis-
miss on the grounds of violation of Rule 8(a)(2).7 1 The court of appeals
held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for pleading violations.72 In reaching this result, the court
reiterated the propriety of a Rule 41(b) dismissal as a sanction for this
pleading violation.73
The court of appeals recounted the facts of the case and concluded
61. Id. See also Note, The Involuntary Dismissal Sanction for Rule 8(a)(2) Violations in Mal-
practice Complaints - A Reversion to Code Pleadings?, 62 N.C.L. REV. 1107 (1984).
62. Jones, 60 N.C. App. at 586, 299 S.E.2d at 300.
63. Id.
64. 65 N.C. App. 91, 308 S.E.2d 662 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 763, 321 S.E.2d 145
(1984). Plaintiff's notice of appeal and petition for discretionary review under North Carolina
General Statute Section 7A-31 was denied. Defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of
substantial constitutional question was allowed.
65. Id. Because two claims for relief were pled by the plaintiff it is unclear whether the prayer
for relief relating to the claim for mismanagement of a receivership, as distinct from legal malprac-
tice, was subject to the strictures of Rule 8(a)(2).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 92, 308 S.E.2d at 663.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 91, 308 S.E.2d at 663.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 664.
73. Id.
10
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that the plaintiff's violation of Rule 8(a)(2) was "flagrant." First, the
plaintiff had been allowed the opportunity to cure his violation by
amending the complaint but had failed to do so.74 Additionally, the
court found that plaintiff had caused adverse media publicity, served the
defendant in open court and informed the state Department of Insurance
that the defendant attorney had been sued for two million dollars for
misappropriation. 75 Noting that the local newspaper and a local radio
station ran news items reporting the plaintiff's two million dollar lawsuit
against Coleman, the court of appeals concluded that, "Plaintiff's viola-
tion of Rule 8(a)(2) may have caused irreparable harm to Coleman's pro-
fessional reputation and to his ability to be afforded a fair trial. Such are
the evils to be avoided by the rule."' 76 The court found that in light of the
determination of the "flagrant and aggravated nature of plaintiff's viola-
tion of the rule, we are compelled to hold the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss."
'77
Harris v. Maready78
In the third reported case, plaintiff Harris sued the law firm that had
represented her in a domestic matter and, as individual defendants, two
attorneys of the law firm, for professional legal malpractice arising from
an alleged conflict of interest.79 The alleged conflict arose from a busi-
ness relationship between the plaintiff's husband and one of the defend-
ants.8° The complaint contained a demand in the prayer for relief for five
million dollars from the law firm and five million dollars from defendants
jointly and severally as compensatory damages for the legal malpractice
claims.81 In the body of the complaint, the plaintiff included a section
labeled "Damages" in which she alleged that she was entitled to recover
damages from defendants "which may exceed five million dollars" and a
like amount was specifically mentioned as punitive damages.
82
74. Id.
75. Id. The court's reliance on Rule 8(a)(2) to handle impropriety in service of process and
adverse publicity was erroneous by established law. Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure addresses the manner of service of process and the Code of Professional Responsibility
addresses the propriety of attorneys engaging in publicity. The court's conclusion of "causing" ad-
verse publicity is also ambiguous absent any fact in the record that the plaintiff initiated contact with
the media. It is certainly possible that the news reporters routinely check the public court file each
day to see if anything interesting has happened. See Smith, supra note 23. One returns, however, to
the problem of a valid complaint, validly "discovered" by the media, but containing some proscribed
language - here a demand for almost two million dollars.
76. Schell, 65 N.C. App. at 94, 308 S.E.2d at 665.
77. Id.
78. 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912 (1984).
79. Id. at 538, 319 S.E.2d at 914.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 549, 319 S.E.2d at 920.
82. Id.
11
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Headline news stories featuring the multi-million dollar demand for
monetary damages immediately followed the filing of the complaint.83
One of the news stories featured the headline "Shirley Harris Sues Ex-
Husband, and Lawyer's Firm for $5 million."84
Prior to the filing of any responsive pleading by the defendants, the
plaintiff filed an amendment to her complaint, without leave of court,
maintaining that such amendment was made as a matter of right under
Rule 15(a) of the rules of civil procedure.85 This amendment by the
plaintiff eliminated all specific monetary damages in the prayer for relief,
substituting the offending language with a request simply for "a sum in
excess of $10,000."86
Plaintiff's amended complaint did not change the "Damages" section
in the body of the original complaint with its request for five million
dollars.87 While the trial court refused to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), the case was dismissed on other
grounds.88 The plaintiff appealed the dismissal on these other grounds
and the defendant cross-appealed, raising the issue of abuse of discretion
by the trial court in refusing to dismiss for violation of Rule 8(a)(2).
89
The court of appeals noted that despite the plaintiff's amendment, the
legal malpractice complaint continued to violate Rule 8(a)(2).90 In ac-
cordance with Jones v. Boyce, the court of appeals held that the trial
court had abused its discretion when denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss "because the complaint remains a pleading based upon profes-
sional malpractice demanding monetary relief of five million dollars
against each defendant."91 After reviewing the holding in Jones v. Boyce,
the court of appeals held that the trial judge abused his discretion by
failing to allow the defendant's motion to dismiss for violation of Rule
8(a)(2).92
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
found that, under the facts of this case, the trial court did not err in
83. Record at 29-30, Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912 (1984) (518A83). Curi-
ously, the Harris opinion makes no mention of this adverse publicity to the defendants' reputations,
even though that same fact featured prominently in Schell. See supra note 75 and accompanying
text.
84. Id. at 50.
85. Harris, 311 N.C. at 549, 319 S.E.2d at 920.
86. Id. at 549-50, 319 S.E.2d at 920.
87. Id. at 550, 319 S.E.2d at 920.
88. Id. at 537, 319 S.E.2d at 913. The trial judge dismissed the complaint and summonses
against the defendants for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of process and service of process.
89. Id.
90. Harris, 63 N.C. App. 1, 15, 306 S.E.2d 799, 808 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912
(1984).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 16, 306 S.E.2d at 808.
12
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denying the motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 8(a)(2).9 3 The court
briefly reviewed sanctions available for violation of similar ad damnum
proscriptions in other states, and specifically disagreed with the state-
ment of the court of appeals in Jones that "absent the strong sanction of
dismissal for violation of Rule 8(a)(2) litigants may ignore the rule's pro-
scription with impunity."94 The court held that, "[a]lthough an action
may be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for a plaintiff's failure to comply with
Rule 8(a)(2), this extreme sanction is to be applied only when the trial
court determines that less drastic sanctions will not suffice." 95
Analysis of Jones, Schell and Harris
After Harris the law of North Carolina, with regard to a Rule 41(b)
dismissal for violation of Rule 8(a)(2), can only be understood by synthe-
sizing the holdings of Jones, Schell, and Harris.
The Harris and Jones cases are similar in all respects except in result.
In both cases, the only violation of the legislative intent of Rule 8(a)(2) to
protect the reputation of professional malpractice defendants was the fil-
ing of a pleading that contained a specific request for monetary damages
as opposed to the required "in excess of $10,000" demand.96 In neither
case did the deciding court find that any aggravating conduct on the part
of the plaintiff led to the further detriment of the policy behind Rule
8(a)(2). Undoubtedly, publicity in both cases resulted from the mere fil-
ing of the lawsuit with the offending specific claim for damages. How-
ever, no finding was made that the plaintiffs in either case had caused
publicity of their professional malpractice claims or that they had vio-
lated an order of the trial judge to amend their pleadings.
There was publicity in both cases that resulted from the mere filing of
the lawsuit with the offending specific claim for damages.9v The only
factual distinction between the two cases is that the plaintiff in Harris
was represented by counsel and the plaintiff in Jones was not.98 Presum-
93. Harris, 311 N.C. at 552, 319 S.E.2d at 922.
94. Id. at 551, 319 S.E.2d at 921.
95. Id. at 551, 319 S.E.2d at 922. North Carolina is the only jurisdiction which allows this
drastic sanction of Rule 41(b) for violation of the ban on pleading damages. See, e.g., Keese v.
Brown, 250 Ga. 383, 297 S.E.2d 487 (1982) (dismissal beyond authority of trial court); Pizzingrilli v.
Von Kessel, 100 Misc. 2d 1062, 420 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1979) (defendant entitled to order striking of-
fending portions of prayer for relief and plaintiff required to serve amended complaint; dismissal for
violation deemed improper); Franz v. Bednarek, 678 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1984) (dismissal improper,
motion to strike or leave to amend should be allowed); see also White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102 (Wyo.
1984) (holding statute eliminating ad damnum in only certain types of civil actions to be an uncon-
stitutional invasion of the judicial branch of the government); McCoy v. Western Baptist Hosp., 628
S.W.2d 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (1976).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 50 and 81-82.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 51 and 83-84.
98. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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ably then, if Jones were decided by the Harris court the result would have
been different.
A comparison of Harris and Schell is more revealing. Both cases in-
volved pleadings that violated Rule 8(a)(2) in that they contained claims
for damages rather than the Rule 8(a)(2) prescribed claim for damages
"in excess of $10,000.""9 Both cases resulted in publicity of the specified
dollar claims against the legal professional malpractice defendants.' I
In Schell, the dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's case was held to be
an appropriate remedy for violation of Rule 8(a)(2).' In Harris, such
dismissal was not appropriate. 11 2 These different results are best under-
stood by examining the facts of both cases as they evidence the intent of
the plaintiff's lawyer involved.
In Schell the trial court ordered the plaintiff to amend his pleadings to
delete the specific dollar demand proscribed by Rule 8(a)(2)."°3 The
plaintiff's counsel either refused or failed to do so.' °4 By way of contrast,
the plaintiff's counsel in Harris amended the pleadings to delete the de-
mand for specific dollar recovery in the ad damnum clause entitled
"Prayer for Relief," while leaving a request for specific dollar damages in
the section of the complaint entitled "Damages."' 0 5 However, the court
held that the complaint in Harris still violated Rule 8(a)(2).'" 6 This sug-
gests that Rule 8(a)(2) applies to all sections of the complaint for com-
pensatory and punitive damages. With regard to amendment, what
distinguishes Harris and Schell is that Schell's counsel showed his bad
faith with regard to the proscriptions of Rule 8(a)(2) while Harris's coun-
sel made a good faith, but erroneous, attempt to comply with the rule.0 7
Schell's lawyer, even when faced with a court order, continued in open
and notorious violation of Rule 8(a)(2). At worst, such activity evi-
dences a specific intent to violate not only Rule 8(a)(2), but also an order
of the court. At best such actions manifest gross negligence.' 08 The ac-
tivity of Harris evidences an error in judgment, based on ignorance of the
99. It is interesting to note that the decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Harris
was issued in August 1984. In September, 1984 the supreme court refused to review the decision of
the court of appeals in Schell, letting stand the intermediate court's opinion upholding dismissal with
prejudice. While Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973)
makes clear that a denial of certiorari or discretionary review by the supreme court is in no way an
approval of the intermediate court's decision, nonetheless, Schell must be read in conjunction with
Harris.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84 and notes 75-76.
101. See supra text accompanying note 77.
102. See supra text accompanying note 93.
103. See supra text accompanying note 68.
104. See supra text accompanying note 69.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
106. See supra text accompanying note 90.
107. See supra test accompanying notes 85-87 and note 69.
108. Violation of a court order can in itself give rise to dismissal. See Note, supra note 61.
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rule." 9 The other major distinction between Harris and Schell concerns
the publicity afforded the pleading. As noted earlier, publicity of the dol-
lar amount of the plaintiff's claim occurred in both cases."' In Harris,
the fact of publicity was not mentioned by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. In Schell, however, the court of appeals specifically found that
the plaintiff's lawyer "caused the publicity." '11
The distinction between the two cases is further understood by focus-
ing on the intent of the lawyer with regard to publicity. The supreme
court's decision in Harris would seem to suggest, by omission of any dis-
cussion concerning publicity, that the fact of publicity is not important.
What is important is how such publicity is caused. In Harris the public-
ity concerning the amount claimed by the plaintiff was certainly a result
of the filing of pleadings in violation of Rule 8(a)(2)."' Once filing had
occurred, counsel for Harris could not control what use the media would
make of the public record of the complaint and apparently did nothing to
further the publicity." 3 In Schell, however, counsel evidenced an intent
to violate Rule 8(a)(2) by "causing" publicity and thereby further ampli-
fying the damage to the professional malpractice defendant sought to be
protected by the rule." 4
In applying Harris and Schell, the trial courts apparently should focus
on whether evidence exists of the intent of plaintiff's counsel when deter-
mining the appropriate remedy for violation of Rule 8(a)(2). The hold-
ing of Harris suggests that a mere violation of the rule will not give rise
to an appropriate use of the extraordinary sanction of dismissal with
prejudice. What is necessary then is not only a showing of a mistake by
the plaintiff's counsel, but a showing of mistake plus some evidence of
bad faith or intent to thwart the legislative intent behind Rule 8(a)(2)
before dismissal with prejudice will be an appropriate sanction. After
Harris, the trial court must, except in flagrant cases such as Schell, "de-
termine that less drastic sanctions will not suffice.""' 5
What then remains of the importance of legislative intent that provides
the foundation to Rule 8(a)(2)?" 6 The legislature sought to protect the
reputation of tort defendants by preventing plaintiffs from naming a dol-
109. In the brief for the court, plaintiff's lawyer in Harris admitted ignorance of the rule's appli-
cation to legal malpractice. Appellant's New Brief at 30, Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 319
S.E.2d 912 (518A83).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84 and notes 75-76.
111. See supra note 75.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84. The fact that the publicity followed the filing of
the complaint by just one day and that the language of the complaint is reflected in the news stories
leads inescapably to this conclusion.
113. See, Smith supra note 23.
114. See supra note 75. See also the legislative history of the rule at note 38.
115. See cases cited supra note 95.
116. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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lar amount for compensatory and punitive damages other than "in excess
of $10,000.",11 7 After Harris, apparently only in the most egregious situ-
ations will dismissal with prejudice be an appropriate sanction.' 1 8 What
follows is a discussion of how the available sanctions address the harm
sought to be prevented by Rule 8(a)(2).
MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE HARM
Can an effective remedy ever be granted to the tort defendant for a
plaintiff's violation of Rule 8(a)(2)? The rules of civil procedure do not
contemplate rectifying damage to reputation of a party, but rather focus
on making a party whole when he is forced, by improper conduct on the
part of his opponent, to incur costs related to the litigation of a lawsuit.
If indeed a tort defendant suffers damage to his reputation by the filing of
a complaint that demands specifically enumerated damages, no remedy is
available within the rules of civil procedure that will repair damaged rep-
utations.119 The remedies that are available include the awarding of
costs, including attorneys' fees for a motion to strike the offending plead-
ing, contempt, and dismissal with prejudice. 2 '
Because the filing of a complaint in violation of Rule 8(a)(2) is a law-
yer-controlled activity, the sanction obviously must be applied against
the lawyer, not his client. The mere granting of costs and expenses will
not be sufficient to deter conduct in violation of Rule 8(a)(2). The lawyer
who seeks to gain some real or imagined advantage by violating the rule
will not be deterred by such nominal'costs.
However, a court may impose sufficiently heavy costs by levying of
fines for contempt against the offending lawyer, thus providing a deter-
rent to such future conduct. The court has such power which may be
used to maximize the desired deterrent effect.' 21 If such costs are suffi-
117. N.C. Gen. Stat. § IA-1, R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (1983); see also supra note 8.
118. See cases cited supra note 95.
119. In some jurisdiction medical malpractice defendants have tried to assert defamation claims
against plaintiffs who violate proscriptions on pleading a specific ad damnum. In each instance,
these claims have been dismissed because of the privilege accorded to a party within the context of a
law suit. See Sullivan v. Birmingham, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 416 N.E.2d 528 (1981); McNeal v.
Allen, 95 Wash. 2d 215, 621 P.2d 1285 (1980).
120. Even the newly amended Rule 11 does not apply in this situation. See supra note 10.
121. Although no cases have yet been decided under the newly revised Rule 11 of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts have imposed stiff sanctions on attorneys who have
violated the mandate of federal Rule 11. See Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986);
Shea v. Donohoe Const. Co., 795 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Unioil Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 802
F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986), pending petition for reh'g, (imposed a sanction of $291,141.10 for a Rule
11 violation).
In addition, North Carolina courts have the inherent power to impose fines and sanctions against
an attorney for disobeying a court order. In re Robinson, 37 N.C. App. 671, 247 S.E.2d 241 (1978).
This inherent power is necessary for the court "to manage its affairs, to see that justice is done, and
to see that the administration ofjustice is accomplished as expeditiously as possible." Id. at 676, 247
S.E.2d at 244. This power extends to citations for contempt, censure, informing the North Carolina
16
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ciently publicized and meted out with sufficient regularity and consis-
tency, the conduct of other lawyers tempted to commit a knowing
violation of Rule 8(a)(2) may be deterred also. However, even this desir-
able end does nothing to remedy the damaged reputation of tort
defendants.
The ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice results in punishing
the offending lawyer by making him the insurer of the original tort de-
fendant. The plaintiff who has had his claim dismissed because of the
activity of his lawyer will have a new cause of action for professional
malpractice against his own attorney.12 2 The original plaintiff's lawyer
thus becomes liable for whatever damages would have been properly
awarded to the plaintiff against the original tort defendant.123 Such a
result seems absurd for a number of reasons.
Surely the offended tort defendant receives a benefit in not having to
defend a lawsuit or pay damages. This benefit apparently has no sound
policy underpinning. If in fact a defendant has committed a tort against
a member of the public, he should be made to answer by paying appro-
priate damages for that tort. 24 This basic premise underlies the entirety
of tort law. A tortfeasor who escapes responsibility for his actions re-
ceives a windfall.'1 5 If the original tort claim was, in fact, baseless then
the tort defendant has no forum to vindicate himself. 126 Moreover, any
damage to the defendant's reputation caused by the filing of the pleading
remains unvindicated.
Also, when the plaintiff's lawyer who knowingly violates Rule 8(a)(2)
becomes the insurer of the original tort defendant and in turn is sued for
professional malpractice, how can that claim be fairly and effectively
prosecuted or defended? Because the original tort claim will form the
basis for damages, the plaintiff will necessarily have to prove that case.
In litigating the claim, discovery will be necessary against the original
tort defendant who is no longer a party.127 As such, all discovery devices
State Bar of the misconduct, imposition of costs, suspension for a limited time of the right to practice
in the state or in that particular court, or disbarment. Id.; see also Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins.
Co., 81 N.C. App. 600, 344 S.E.2d 847 (1986).
122. Unfamiliarity with the rules of pleading and failure to follow them certainly amounts to
legal malpractice when the client's claim is dismissed as the proximate result of the lawyer's action.
See discussion supra note 7.
123. P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
124. Id. § 1, at 5-6.
125. Id. § 1, at 6.
126. The tort defendant's reputation will actually be in worse condition because the fact that he
has been sued is a matter of public record, yet he has no forum to vindicate himself "on the merits."
If the original tort defendant "wins" at all, it is only on a technicality.
127. Distinctions are made in the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure as to discovery avail-
able against parties in a lawsuit, as opposed to witnesses. The use of "requests for production" under
Rule 34, "requests to admit" under Rule 36, "requests for mental and physical examinations" under
17
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and enforcement procedures available only against parties will be un-
available to the plaintiff with regard to the original tort defendant."2 8
Even more problematic is that the plaintiff's former lawyer, the new
defendant, most certainly will have received confidential information re-
garding the original tort claim from his former client.129 Such informa-
tion of the former client may not be used by his former lawyer to the
lawyer's advantage.13° In addition, counsel for the former lawyer, now
defendant, will not be able to consult with the original tort defendant
whose conduct is at the heart of the lawsuit. This twist makes an ade-
quate defense and a fair result unlikely.
Finally, should the plaintiff prevail against his former lawyer and re-
ceive damages predicated on the tortious conduct of the original defend-
ant, what is the impact on the original defendant? Because of the odd
posture of the lawsuit, the original defendant will have little or no control
over the outcome, and his reputation may be further damaged by a nego-
tiated settlement or verdict in which he had little voice.13 The former
lawyer, now defendant, will have little interest, for example, in prevent-
ing publicity of a negotiated award predicated on the tort of the original
defendant which can lead to headlines such as "Former Patient Received
$1,000,000 for Doctor's Mistake".132 Such headlines certainly might fur-
ther damage the reputation of the original tort defendant. Also, if the
plaintiff receives an award predicated on the original tort defendant's ac-
tions, what is the effect on his liability insurance rates? Because he could
not control the second lawsuit, he would have no power to further effect
disposition, and his liability insurance carrier pays no money; he could
argue that the award should have no effect on his rates. But if he did
commit an act of negligence or one subjecting him to punitive damages
and such an act can now be documented, is he not a poorer risk and
should not his carrier be entitled to higher premiums to reflect that
risk?
133
Rule 35, and the economical interrogatory practices under Rule 33 are limited to parties, not wit-
nesses in a lawsuit.
128. For failure to comply with discovery a court has much broader authority to sanction a
party than is available against a witness. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § IA-1, R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)
(1983).
129. N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Canon IV, Rule 4(A) (N.C. State Bar 1985).
130. Rules 4(C)(3) and 4(C)(5) of Canon IV of the N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
logically do not apply to this situation.
131. Perhaps intervention under Rule 24 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure would
be allowed because the former defendant would be able to meet the requirements of the rule.
132. Typically, settlements in professional malpractice cases are conditioned on confidentiality.
133. Ironically, the original thrust behind amending the rule on pleading the ad damnuin came
in 1976 and 1986 from a legislature concerned about a liability insurance crisis and the high cost of
providing such insurance. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3 and 30-31. The effect of granting
this most severe penalty available for a violation of Rule 8(a)(2) is to thwart the natural effect of
liability on the cost of insurance.
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What then is left of the policy behind Rule 8(a)(2) to protect the repu-
tation of tort defendants? After Harris, dismissal with prejudice is a
most unlikely result and, as has been argued, a most undesirable one.
1 34
The granting of the costs for the legal activity of the defendant to strike
the pleading is ineffective. Further, the use of contempt against the of-
fending plaintiff's lawyer does nothing to remedy the harm sought to be
protected by Rule 8(a)(2).
One suggested answer lies in the availability of the common law tort of
abuse of process.1 35 Perhaps the only effective remedy is to allow a cause
of action by the original tort defendant against the original plaintiff's
lawyer for abuse of process. This remedy accomplishes the original in-
tent of the drafters of Rule 8(a)(2) by protecting, or at least vindicating,
the reputation of tort defendants. The two elements of an action for
abuse of process are 1) an ulterior motive and 2) an act in the use of legal
process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding. 36
Abuse of process arises in a situation where process is at first validly
issued, for example, in a valid negligence or punitive damage claim. Af-
ter the issuance of the process, however, the plaintiff uses the valid legal
process for a purpose for which it was not intended. The cases involving
violation of Rule 8(a)(2) fit this mold perfectly. The plaintiff files a valid
complaint for negligence or punitive damages. Plaintiff's lawyer, how-
ever, violates the strictures of Rule 8(a)(2) which are known to him and
which, as an attorney, must be followed. This constitutes the ulterior
motive to use the judicial system for an improper use, the improper use
being the deliberate harm to the tort defendants' reputation.
1 37
Allowing the remedy of abuse of process to the tort defendant is the
only way to effectuate the out-of-court policy of Rule 8(a)(2), the protec-
tion of defendants' reputations. All of the other procedural sanctions
available for Rule 8(a)(2) violations have only the systemic or in-court
134. In Stokes v. Wilson & Redding Law Firm, 72 N.C. App. 107, 323 S.E.2d 470 (1984), cerL
denied, 313 N.C. 612, 332 S.E.2d 83 (1985), the trial court's dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's com-
plaint violating Rule 8(a)(2) and seeking three million dollars in a legal malpractice claim was re-
versed.
In Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 314 N.C. 550, 336 S.E.2d 66 (1985), a products liability case, the
original complaint was dismissed because the plaintiff's prayer for damages violated Rule 8(a)(2).
However, the order of dismissal permitted the plaintiff to file a new action within a year based on the
same claim.
In Miller v. Ferree, 84 N.C. App. 135, 136, 351 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1987), the North Carolina Court
of Appeals stated: "It is clear that a dismissal with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(b) is an available
sanction for a plaintiff's violation of Rule 8(a)(2)." However, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's determination that dismissal without prejudice was an appropriate sanction in a legal mal-
practice case where the plaintiff's violations of Rule 8(a)(2) resulted in at least three newspaper
articles concerning the lawsuit.
135. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 123, § 85, at 608, § 32, at 185.
136. Byrd, Malicious Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. REv. 285, 288 (1968).
137. Id; see also Ledford v. Smith, 212 N.C. 447, 193 S.E.2d 722 (1937); Abernathy v. Burns,
210 N.C. 636, 188 S.E.2d 97 (1936); Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N.C. 104, 73 S.E. 228 (1911).
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purpose of thwarting the offending behavior and ensuring the intended
operation of the civil justice system. These sanctions under the rules of
civil procedure can do no more than enforce the obligation of attorneys
to follow rules whose purpose is exclusively and primarily to make the
judicial system function fairly and efficiently.' 38 The only vindication for
the out-of-court policy interest of protecting defendants' reputations is to
apply the remedy of abuse of process, which is of a substantive, rather
than procedural nature.
CONCLUSION
If the wish of the legislature is to continue with this practice of prohib-
iting the mention of specific dollar amounts in negligence and punitive
damage actions, the rule should be amended to provide a sanction or
remedy for its violation. This author would propose the following:
Dismissal with prejudice is not an available remedy for violation of Rule
8(a)(2). In cases of knowing and willful violation of Rule 8(a)(2), such
proof will be prima facie evidence for a claim of abuse of process against
the plaintiff's attorney.
These suggested changes in Rule 8(a)(2) would provide fair notice to
litigants and their attorneys, encourage consistency, and establish a sanc-
tion that is reasonably related to the harm which this rule was intended
to remedy.
138. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § IA-l, R. Civ. P. 1 (1983); Sizemore, supra note 12.
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